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"Tell the chef, the beer is on me."
Deutsche Brennelemente für Druckwasserreaktor Tihange 2
J. Döschner, WDR
27.03.2017 20:02 Uhr
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Gov’t and TEPCO put money before safety at Fukushima nuclear plant: court ruling
The Maebashi District Court ordered the central government and Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) to pay damages in a class action lawsuit brought by Fukushima Prefecture residents who evacuated to Gunma Prefecture and elsewhere due to the Fukushima nuclear disaster. However, the amount was much smaller than what the plaintiffs had demanded, thereby failing to provide nuclear crisis victims the relief they seek.
On March 17, the Maebashi District Court recognized the responsibility of both the central government and TEPCO, operator of the stricken Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant. It stated that TEPCO should have been aware that the Fukushima plant could be hit by tsunami approximately nine years prior to the March 11, 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, and that the state failed to order TEPCO to take appropriate anti-tsunami measures despite having the regulatory authority to do so.
“That the court recognized the central government’s liability for compensation is very significant,” the plaintiffs’ lead counsel Katsuyoshi Suzuki said at a rally that was held in Maebashi following the ruling. “It is also extremely important that the court recognized that the state was as culpable as TEPCO.”
The plaintiffs argued that TEPCO could have predicted a massive tsunami and taken measures to prevent a nuclear crisis. They also argued that the government was responsible for promoting the development and use of nuclear power. In its ruling, the court harshly criticized TEPCO, taking into account the far-reaching impacts and dangers of the ongoing nuclear disaster. “The utility must maintain a safety-first policy, but it appears to have placed priority on cost cutting,” the ruling said.
In July 2002, the government’s Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion pointed out the possibility that an approximately magnitude 8 earthquake could occur in the Japan Trench, part of which runs along the ocean floor off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture. Based on this “long-term evaluation,” TEPCO estimated in 2008 that tsunami with a maximum height of 15.7 meters could hit its Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant, yet no safety measures based on this estimate were taken.
Instead, TEPCO used a tsunami assessment formula created by the Japan Society of Civil Engineers (JSCE), comprising university professors and power company researchers, which put the height of tsunami that could potentially hit the nuclear plant at a mere 6.1 meters. The tsunami that slammed into the plant on March 11, 2011 hit a maximum height of 15.5 meters.
The Maebashi court took issue with the fact that although TEPCO could have instituted relatively easy anti-tsunami measures, such as relocating its emergency power source to higher ground, it had failed to do so. The Atomic Energy Damage Compensation Law — which stipulates that the business operator, regardless of whether or not they were negligent, must pay damages in the case of a nuclear disaster — was applied to reach the decision. However, the court rejected the claim for compensation based on illegal action under the Civil Code.
The ruling also went into detail regarding the government’s responsibility. In September 2006, the now defunct Nuclear Safety Committee (NSC) laid down new earthquake-resistance standards, and the government instructed TEPCO and other utilities to assess whether their nuclear power plants met the new criteria. However, in August 2007, TEPCO submitted a mid-term report to the government that did not include any anti-tsunami measures. The Maebashi District Court’s ruling pointed out that the government subsequently violated the law by not ordering TEPCO to implement anti-tsunami measures. It also said, “The state was in a position to take the initiative to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and was strongly expected to appropriately exercise its regulatory authority to prevent nuclear disasters.”
Much of the evidence and issues that were reviewed by the court are the same as those being reviewed in similar class-action lawsuits and the criminal trials of former TEPCO executives, whose pretrial conference procedures are to be held March 29.
The Maebashi ruling “made clear the government’s negligence in postponing checks on whether new quake-resilience standards were being met,” says attorney Yuichi Kaido, who will represent the victims in the upcoming criminal trial. “That matches our claims. The ruling was groundbreaking, and it will create a tide that will influence other court cases.”
Because there are many other similar cases being fought in courts nationwide, it is highly likely that the dispute will continue in an appeal trial in the Tokyo High Court. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga told a press conference on March 17, “We will look closely at the content of the ruling, and deliberate a response from there,” hinting that the government will look to appeal.
Ruling on Fukushima nuclear crisis a grave admonition of gov’t
In a class action suit filed by residents of Fukushima Prefecture who evacuated to Gunma Prefecture and elsewhere due to the ongoing Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant disaster, the Maebashi District Court ordered both the plant operator, Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), and the central government to pay 62 residents a total of 38.55 million yen. It marked the first time that the judiciary recognized the state’s responsibility for negligence in the nuclear disaster.
The court ruling should be seen as admonition from the judiciary that the state has a grave responsibility over its nuclear power policy.
The main focus of the case was on whether TEPCO had been able to predict the size of the tsunami that struck the plant on March 11, 2011, and whether the state should have exercised its regulatory authority to make TEPCO implement necessary safety measures.
The plaintiffs focused on a long-term assessment on earthquakes, which the government released in 2002, as evidence to show that TEPCO had been able to predict a tsunami like the one that hit the Fukushima plant. The report stated that there was about a 20 percent chance that an earthquake of around magnitude 8 would occur off the coast between the northern Sanriku region and the Boso Peninsula within the next 30 years.
Based on this report, TEPCO predicted in 2008 that tsunami with a maximum height of 15.7 meters could hit the Fukushima No. 1 plant. The actual tsunami that hit the nuclear power station on March 11, 2011, however, was 15.5 meters tall. The plaintiffs argued that if TEPCO had taken the appropriate anti-tsunami measures based on the long-term assessment and other specific forecasts, the nuclear crisis could have been avoided.
The Maebashi District Court ruled almost entirely in favor of the plaintiffs, saying that TEPCO neglected to take measures despite having been able to predict that such a large tsunami could hit the nuclear plant, putting cost-cutting ahead of safety.
The court also handed down a similar decision regarding the culpability of the central government. Nuclear disasters cause irreparable damage over a large area. The court ruled that the fact that the central government did not exercise its regulatory authority even though TEPCO’s anti-tsunami measures were insufficient was extremely unreasonable when considering the import of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law and other rules. It is notable, also, that the court ruled that the state’s responsibility was on par with that of TEPCO’s, and ordered the state to pay the plaintiffs the same amount in damages as the utility.
At the same time, however, the ruling was parsimonious in the compensation amount that it ordered be paid to the individual plaintiffs. Because the court deducted compensation money that TEPCO has already paid, the amount it approved was far below what the plaintiffs had demanded.
The plaintiffs had demanded 11 million yen per person — including for those who had evacuated voluntarily — citing loss of their hometowns and jobs, and grave emotional distress. For many of the plaintiffs, therefore, the ruling has likely come as a disappointment.
Around 30 similar lawsuits have been filed nationwide, by around 12,000 plaintiffs who have evacuated from Fukushima Prefecture. Rulings have not yet been handed down in any of those cases.
Why wasn’t the disaster prevented? Who is responsible? Much of the public is still seeking answers to these questions.
However, the nuclear disaster investigative committees of both the government and the Diet have disbanded, bringing their respective probes into causes of the crisis to a halt. The lessons from the ongoing disaster have yet to be learned in their entirety. It is because a single nuclear incident has grave and far-reaching consequences that an examination of its cause is so important.
I am angry to the depths of my soul that the earth has been so injured while we were all bemused by supposed monuments of value and intellect, vaults of bogus cultural riches... Sellafield, which pours waste plutonium into the world's natural environment, and bomb grade plutonium into the world's political environment. For money.
So wrote US author Marilynne Robinson in Mother Country in 1989, a few years after the 1983 discovery by Yorkshire TV(video embed below) of the child leukemia excess (ten times the expected number) at Seascale, a village next to the Sellafield nuclear site.
In the documentary, presented by a young David Dimbleby, we see the evidence and a debate between Professor Ed Radford (who started me out on my radiation enquiry in 1991) and a young Wilks on one side, and two men from British Nuclear Fuels.
Despite the Black Inquiry , a court case (Reay and Hope vs BNFL), several reports from the National Radiological Protection Board NRPB and their Alice in Wonderland Mirror, COMARE, no one pointed out that the science behind all the protestations of innocence is bogus.
The court case was lost for the same reason. Martyn Day the solicitor was advised to use the fathers' exposures and genetic risk as a strategy - a mistake that cost them the case. It was the direct exposures from the beaches that were the cause of the child leukemias, not the fathers.
So all BNFL had to do to win, was to show that there were leukemia children whose fathers did not work at Sellafield. Which there were.
There is no single measure of 'radiation'
The essential problem was that everyone assumed that there was a valid scientific way of measuring radiation which applied equally to all kinds of exposure, and that it produced a number, called the 'dose' which could be used to quantify biological damage (and therefore child leukemia).
BNFL argued that the fact that there was a lot of plutonium on the beach and in the houses at Seascale was not enough. To get enough 'dose' from plutonium, the children would have had to eat some kilograms of house dust. Accepting this nonsense, the late Prof Gardner (and the court case) attempted to get around this by arguing that it was a genetic effect delivered by the fathers' sperm.
A mistake, as I wrote to Martyn Day at the time, and also to Gardner. But Gardner (aged 50, not a smoker) went into hospital with lung cancer just after I sent my letter, and never came out.
The 1984 Black Inquiry was less easily fooled. Sir Douglas Black recommended two new independent outfits to investigate the problem. They were the Small Area Health Statistics Unit (SAHSU) and the Committee on Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment, (COMARE).
COMARE was quickly infiltrated by the nuclear industry faithful, and produced one biased report after another exonerating Sellafield as a cause of the child cancers. It used the same 'dose' argument as BNFL in the documentary, as did NRPB's evidence to Sir Douglas.
Initially COMARE toyed with the idea of population mixing and an unknown virus as the cause, but conceded there was no population mixing at Sellafield. However, its latest 17th Report, published last year, finally gave way and decided that it was population mixing after all.
Contamination of the seashore? What contamination?
This seashore contamination has, since 1983, spread to the coast of north Wales where it is measured and where there was a 18-fold child cancer excess by 2004, and to Carlingford in Ireland (see Wolves of Water, Busby 2007) with similar effects.
Well, what is the fuss about? What should the locals and holidaymakers be afraid of?
Video: 'Windscale - The Nuclear Laundry', first broadcast on Yorkshire TV, 1st November 1983.
I was sent a scanning electron microscope (SEM) photograph by Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment (CORE) the local anti-nuclear NGO. A sample from the tidal estuary of the river Esk near a popular coastal path. I was asked to comment. I show the SEM picture in Figure 1 (above right).
It was collected by CORE for Arnie Gundersen during his brief visit to Cumbria and given to Dr Marco Kaltofen from Boston MA, USA who measures particles. Marco told me on the phone that there were many such particles found in this mud sample. His machine also uses X-ray fluorescence, and can identify the elemental composition of any particle. The XRF spectrum is inset. It shows that the particle is made from Plutonium and Americium.
I knew already that the mud in that area was highly contaminated with plutonium. CORE had sent me samples in the 1990s which I still have and which I use to calibrate my gamma spectrometers. One of those had 22,000Bq/kg Plutonium-239 together with about the same amount of Cs-137 and a host of other nasty isotopes.
Killer isotope of the future: Americium 241
But this is the first time I had seen the villain of the piece, the hot particle. You need some fancy gear for that. Plutonium-241 is a major effluent from Sellafield, a beta emitter with a half-life of just 14 years turning into the alpha emitter Americium-241 with a half-life of 432 years.
For this reason, the concentration of the Am-241 in the Irish Sea sediments is increasing, even if they shut the pipeline tomorrow. Waves of this material reached the Irish coast in the late 1990s and by now has contaminated the beaches near Dublin and will soon (or may have already) reached Waterford. It has been along the coast of Wales since the 1980s, building up in the Menai and on a big tidal sediment bank called the Lavan Sands.
Marco used gamma spectrometry to show that the bulk sample had a radioactivity of 390 kBq/kg (390,000) with signals from Caesium-137 and Americium 241. A Becquerel is one disintegration per second. One click on a Geiger counter.
So what about the individual particles? The one in the picture is about 50 microns diameter. Marco says the XRF suggests about 50% Americium and perhaps 20% Plutonium. I can use these figures to calculate that the activity of the particle itself is about 150,000 Bq of alpha radiation and about 500,000 Bq of beta radiation.
This is a single particle of diameter slightly smaller than the average human hair, invisible to the naked eye. Such a particle is easily resuspended in the air by wind, and indeed will automatically fly itself into the air as a result of the electrostatic charge it builds up as it emits charge in the form of beta and alpha radiation.
That such material is brought ashore over kilometre distances by 'sea-to-land' transfer was discovered by scientists from Harwell in the 1980s. Plutonium from Sellafield has been measured in childrens' teeth right across England .
Radiation levels on Sellafield beach 50 times inland levels
We can get some idea of the general level of contamination here. CORE have a Geiger counter which they have used for a long time to astound journalists, school parties, students and campaigners. The meter jumps from a background inland of 5 to 10 to 200 to 300 counts per Second in the area where the sample was taken.
This equates to a dose rate of about 3 microSieverts per hour (uSv/h) over the contamination. That fits reasonably well with Marco's result for the bulk sample. Prof Imanaka from Kyoto University visited the area in 2014 and took some samples back to Japan: he found Cs-137 and Americium-241, but at lower levels, around 1,000 Bq/kg.
In passing, there are some odd results in the official data, the annual Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries RIFE reports. They seem to be misreporting the dose rates over the contamination. In the latest 2015 report we see 500 Bq/kg of Cs-137 and 1,200 Bq/kg Am-241. If we assume a depth of 50cm, this translates into a surface activity of about 400 kBq/m2, which is roughly what Prof Sanderson found in his 1990 aerial gamma survey.
It is technically straightforward  to turn this surface contamination into a gamma dose rate at 1 metre above the ground. We get 1.9 uSv/h. So this roughly agrees with CORE since my calculation is only for the Cs-137. But RIFE reports around 0.1 to 0.2 uSv/h.
Perhaps they took their gamma readings at high tide? Reducing measurements by 90%
So although RIFE contamination levels agree with the independent measurements, the official dose rates (including Prof Sanderson's) are about 10 to 20 times too low. Of course, at estuary high tide, all this gamma activity is covered by water and the dose rate will fall by a factor of 10. Maybe RIFE only get out their gear when the water has covered up the contamination?
What do all these numbers mean to the non-scientist? Well, the Geiger counter dose rate of 3 uSv/h tells us that the area contamination is about 900 kBq/m2 in that tidal area of the River Esk. The particle analysis tells us that the radioactivity is mainly in Plutonium and Americium hot particles with some Caesium-137.
This hot particle scenario is the same as in the inner Chernobyl contamination zones. The dose rate is about equal to the level of contamination in the 30km zone of the Fukushima reactors shortly after the disaster.
Recently, BBC reporter Rupert Wingfield Hayes measured 3 uSv/h in the Fukushima exclusion zone; the clip being where radiation expert Geraldine 'Gerry' Thomas made her classic arithmetical gaffe.
The United Nations developed a contamination classification scheme after Chernobyl. Its definition of contaminated land was 37-185 kBq/m2. The Chernobyl Zone of Permanent Control was set at 185-555 kBq/m2 . So we can say that the estuary is 'radioactively contaminated land' and should be a 'zone of permanent control' under the United Nations definition.
Suppressing the inconvenient truth
A number of questions arise in the mind of the man on the Clapham Omnibus.
First, how is it that it took a TV company to draw attention to the dead bodies of the children, rather than the health authority?
Second, how is it that it takes the investigation of a sample obtained by ordinary people and a helpful scientist in America to show a picture of what there is in the sand and mud down there? Why wasn't this done by COMARE, NRPB, BNFL, Harwell, and so forth?
Third, how is it that none of the authorities there have measured the radioactivity and the particles and fenced it all off?
This would happen in the Soviet Union, it would happen in the USA. CORE have consistently complained to the local authorities and the Sellafield Environmental Health watchdog Group about these contaminations, but have been ever ignored or fobbed off. They tell me that one Sellafield PR response was that it did not matter as people usually wore gumboots.
Finally, how is it that no one connected the hot particles with the childhood cancers and calculated the huge doses that even one of these particles, inhaled and internalised, would deliver to local tissue in organs of the body?
Well the answer is simple. It is that the nuclear military complex, lobby, mafia, however you describe it, it is powerful and real, and continues to keep a death grip on the scientific picture of radiation and health. And COMARE, like the other 'independent' scientific agencies and committees that provide the governmental theatricals, are populated with idiots, placemen and dodgy characters.
COMARE was intended by Sir Douglas Black, at the Seascale Inquiry, to provide investigative research independent from NRPB. But they share the same site at UK Atomic Energy Research Harwell. One of the first secretaries, John Cooper, went on to become Director of NRPB, now called Public Health England, though he disappeared rapidly when the German sea-dumping documentary caught him out on TV (below).
Death in a grain of dust
On COMARE there's Richard Wakeford, ex BNFL. Any conflict of interest there? None reported. And there's Frank de Vocht, who writes for Sense about Science and attacks all my published papers.
SAHSU, the epidemiological wing of this cover-up (now known in epidemiology circles as the 'cluster-busters') is no better: it spent its energy (and government money) developing epidemiological tools to prove the childhood leukemia clusters like Seascale, were due to random chance. I wrote a poem about this in 2003 entitled 'Paul Elliott' after its Director.
At Sellafield, along that coast,
Out of the corner of your eye
You'll maybe see a little ghost
A girl who didn't have to die
If you're lucky, you may see her dance
Sadly along that altered shore
It's certain she's only there by chance
That's what I'm told: I can't say more.
So let's look at the overall picture. Sticking with poetry, TS Eliot's line, "I will show you fear in a handful of dust" seems the most appropriate summary. Only it's worse: death on Sellafield beach is lurking in a single grain of dust so tiny as to be invisible, yet spitting out 650,000 alpha and beta particles every second.
And Sellafield, the largest legitimized source of radioactive pollution in the world, has turned that beautiful coast into Eliot's Waste Land.
But there are no United Nations warning notices at the beaches and estuaries near Sellafield.
The areas should be fenced off. The coastal villages must be evacuated.
After researchers realized over a third of the world’s oceans were contaminated from the Fukushima rector’s explosion, a team of researchers from the University of Victoria started investigating radioactive samples of salmon.
The American West Coast is also contaminated, and traces of seaborne Cesium 123 (the indicator of Fukushima nuclear contamination) can still be detected in the ocean waters.
WHOI is a crowd-funded science seawater sampling project, which has been monitoring the radioactive plume making its way across the Pacific to America’s west coast, from the demolished Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in eastern Japan.
This isn’t the first reported case of contamination far from the waters in Fukushima; in fact, there have been numerous reports, but only now is the story gaining mainstream traction.
According to the tests, the samples from the Oregon coast measured around 0.3 becquerels per cubic meter for cesium 134.This level of radiation was deemed safe and “not a risk to humans or the environment” by multiple researchers in both the US and Canada. Of course, we know better – there’s no such thing as safe amount of radiation for living organisms. Every exposure to radiation, no matter how small, increases our risk for cancer and other serious medical conditions…which is why we’ll be avoiding salmon for a while.
Noch laufen acht Atommeiler in Deutschland, aber schon jetzt produzieren die erneuerbaren Energien mehr als doppelt so viel Strom. Im vergangenen Jahr erreichte die Stromproduktion aus Photovoltaik, Windenergie, Wasserkraft und Biomasse mehr als 188 Terawattstunden, wie die Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien in einer Statistik am Freitag veröffentlichte. Das ist mehr „als es die Atomkraft je geschafft hat“, erklärte der Geschäftsführer der Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien (AEE), Philipp Vohrer,
Anlässlich der sich am 11. März jährenden Reaktorkatastrophe im japanischen Fukushima betonte Vohrer, dass das Ende des Atomzeitalters in Deutschland kein Grund sei, die Bestrebungen beim Ausbau der Erneuerbaren zurückzufahren. „Wenn wir unsere Ziele beim Klimaschutz erreichen wollen, dürfen wir das Wachstum der Erneuerbaren jetzt nicht bremsen, sondern müssen es beschleunigen“, sagte Vohrer. Ein dynamischer weiterer Ausbau der regenerativen Energien sei notwendig, damit sie auch die klimaschädliche fossile Energie ersetzen könne.
Dem Ökostromanbieter Lichtblick zufolge erhielt die fossile und Atomenergie seit 1970 eine finanzielle Förderung in Höhe von 460 Milliarden Euro. Im gleichen Zeitraum sind die erneuerbaren Energien nur mit 126 Milliarden gefördert worden, wie der aktuelle Stand des Energiebarometers am Freitag zeigte. Nicht einberechnet seien dabei jedoch die „Ewigkeitslasten“ der fossilen und Kernenergie, wie beispielsweise die hohen Kosten für die Endlagerung des Atommülls.
Trotz aller Risiken und steigenden Kosten werde die Atomenergie in Europa weiterhin gefördert und sogar ausgebaut. Der AEE zufolge habe die EU-Kommission erst Anfang dieser Woche die staatlichen Hilfen Ungarns für zwei Großreaktoren an der Donau genehmigt. Das Unternehmen Areva aus Frankreich belasten durch die explodierenden Kosten beim Bau des Atomreaktors Olkiluoto in Finnland so hohe Schulden, dass sogar eine Zerschlagung durch den französischen Staat drohe. „Die Probleme der Unternehmen zeigen: Nicht nur für den Steuerzahler, sondern auch für die Privatwirtschaft droht mit der Atomkraft ein Milliardengrab“, erklärte Vohrer weiter.
Die Atom-Subventionen in den europäischen Ländern erscheine bei der Betrachtung der Einspeisevergütung für Solarparks oder für Windstrom an Land noch weniger plausibel. Diese liegen nach AEE-Angaben pro Kilowattstunde deutlich unter dem, was etwa die britische Regierung künftig für Atomstrom aus dem geplanten Kernkraftwerk Hinkley Point C zahlen will. Vohrer kommt daher zum Schluss: „Für den europäischen Strommarkt der Zukunft sind Investitionen in eine flexible, saubere Stromproduktion aus erneuerbaren Energien eindeutig die bessere Wahl.“
Ein Kumpel hat mal beim Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz um eine Stellungnahme gebeten. Hier ist deren Antwort:
Sehr geehrter Herr Rosengart,Es bleibt also weiterhin ein Mysterium!
vielen Dank für Ihre Anfrage und Ihr Interesse in unsere Arbeit.
Ein Zusammenhang zwischen dem Vorfall im norwegischen Forschungsreaktor Halden Ende Oktober und den leicht erhöhten Aktivitätskonzentrationen von Jod-131 Anfang dieses Jahres kann aufgrund der sehr kurzen Halbwertszeit von Jod-131 weitgehend ausgeschlossen werden. Jod-131 hat eine Halbwertszeit von 8 Tagen, das bedeutet, dass nach 8 Tagen durch den radioaktiven Zerfall nur noch die Hälfte der ursprünglichen Menge vorhanden ist. Es liegt darüber hinaus keine Meldung der Internationalen Atomenergiebehörde IAEA aus dem Januar vor, die einen erneuten ähnlichen Vorfall im Forschungsreaktor Halden nahelegen würde.
Es gibt aus der gegenwärtigen Datenlage keinerlei Hinweis darauf, dass die Jod-131-Konzentrationen aus einem (a) Akw oder von einem (b) Atomtest stammen könnten:
- Es ist kein realistisches Szenario vorstellbar, bei dem aus einem Kernkraftwerk ausschließlich Jod-131 entweicht. In solchen Fällen müssten sich auch andere radioaktive Stoffe nachweisen lassen wie beispielsweise Cäsium und auch Edelgase.
- Die CTBTO (Organisation des Vertrags über das umfassende Verbot von Nuklearversuchen) betreibt ein weltweites Messnetz mit seismischen, hydroakustischen und Infraschallmessstationen - diese würden die damit verbundene Sprengung nachweisen. Außerdem würde man dann auch nicht nur Jod-131 sondern auch andere radioaktive Stoffe messen, was nicht der Fall ist.
Ich hoffe, ich konnte Ihnen mit meiner Antwort etwas weiterhelfen. Wenn Sie weitere Fragen haben melden Sie sich bitte.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen
Une « petite » fuite d'iode radioactive a été détectée lundi dans un réacteur de recherche nucléaire dans le sud de la Norvège, a annoncé mardi l'Autorité norvégienne de protection contre les radiations.
Dans un communiqué, l'Autorité indique que la priorité est d'arrêter la fuite et dit n'avoir constaté pour le moment aucun effet sur la santé ou l'environnement en dehors du réacteur.
"Tell the chef, the beer is on me."
"Basically the price of a night on the town!"
"I'd love to help kickstart continued development! And 0 EUR/month really does make fiscal sense too... maybe I'll even get a shirt?" (there will be limited edition shirts for two and other goodies for each supporter as soon as we sold the 200)